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Taxing Human Capital: A Good Idea
Abstract
This paper studies a Ramsey optimal taxation model with human capital in an 
inﬁ  nite-horizon setting. Contrary to Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997), the human 
capital production function does not include the current stock of human capital as 
a production factor. As a result, the return to human capital, namely labor income, 
does not vanish in equilibrium. In a stationary state, the household underinvests in 
human capital relative to the ﬁ  rst best, i.e., education is distorted. Human capital is 
eﬀ  ectively taxed. The optimal tax scheme prescribes making the cost of education not 
fully tax-deductible.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: H21, I28, J24
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“Is physical capital special?” Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) ask. Using
the Ramsey approach (Ramsey, 1927), they add human capital to an opti-
mal taxation model with physical capital similar to that of Chamley (1986)
and Judd (1985).Bymodelinghuman capital almost symmetrically to phy-
sical capital they show that in a stationary state all taxes are zero. The Cha-
melyandJudd’sresultisthusshowntoextend tohumancapital.Whatdri-
ves this zero-tax result is that the human capital production function fea-
tures constant returns to scale with respect to the stock of human capital.
Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) call this speciﬁcation a zero-proﬁt condi-
tion. As a consequence, human capital disappears as an object of taxation
in a competitive equilibrium. But they acknowledge that if the human ca-
pital production function violates the assumption of constant returns to
scale, the stationary-state labor tax will not be zero. Jones, Manuelli, and
Rossi (1997) raise an intriguing question and provide useful insights into
the nature of optimal taxation, but in the end, unfortunately, no answer
is evident. The difference between physical and human capital still is not
clear, because they have made it disappear by means of zero-proﬁt condi-
tions.1
This paper takes up the issue of modeling human capital almost sym-
metrically to physical capital. I drop the constant-returns-to-scale assump-
tion. The human capital production function does not include the current
stock of human capital, which therefore is not self-productive. It does not
raise the productivity of human capital investments, or interchangeably,
education. The increasing and concave production function only includes
the household’s time devoted to education. Time spent on education can-
1See also Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, pp. 534) for this line of argument.
4not be substituted by physical goods.2 Instead, the household has to pay
for veriﬁable3 direct costs, e.g.,s tuition fees, that depend on the amount of
education. The government may choose to subsidize this cost. It therefore
has two instruments at its disposal to guide education. Labor taxes and
the subsidy both affect the opportunity cost of education. The next peri-
ods’ labor tax rates affect the discounted stream of marginal earnings from
education.
I derive two results: The ﬁrst one is not surprising but nonetheless im-
portant, as it helps to clarify the role of zero capital taxation when the
model features human capital. The other is new and shows how to de-
al with proﬁts coming from education. First, optimal taxation in the sta-
tionary state prescribes not taxing capital income, as Chamley (1986) and
Judd (1985) show. The zero-capital-tax result holds despite the presence of
human capital. Lucas (1990), Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) and Chari
and Kehoe (1999) also derive this result. The education decision depends
only on how the labor tax and the education subsidy interact with each
other. This relates to the second result, stating that in the optimum the
marginal social return to education is larger than the marginal social cost.
The so-called Education Efﬁciency Theorem (Richter, 2009), which states that
the education decision is undistorted given certain assumptions, does not
hold. From the inequality between the ma r g i n a ls o c i a lr e t u r na n dt h em a r -
ginal social cost it follows that education is effectively taxed, i.e., the pri-
vate rate of return to education is smaller than the social rate of return.
Turning to the underlying tax rates, it results that the cost of education is
not fully tax-deductible, the labor income tax rate is higher than the rate
2Allowing for physical goods as an additional production factor does not affect the
results obtained by Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997), as Chari and Kehoe (1999) show.
3Reis (2007, chapter 4) assumes that the government cannot distinguish between con-
sumption andexpendituresoneducationandﬁndsthatitisoptimaltotaxhumancapital.
5of subsidization. As a consequence, the household underinvests in human
capital relative to the ﬁrst best.
The second result is striking. Since the household is endowed with per-
fect foresight and therefore must be able to internalize the effects of its ac-
tions, one would have expected to derive an equality between the private
and social rates of return to education, and the Education EfﬁciencyTheorem
to hold - a result that Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997), among others,4 al-
so obtain. Their zero-tax results imply that all private and social rates of
return from investments in physical and human capital are equal in the
stationary state. The difference in results is due to how I model the accu-
mulation of human capital. The speciﬁcation used gives rise to proﬁts in
equilibrium. Proﬁts from education are not pure in the strict sense, becau-
se they still depend on raw labor supply. The government taxes away part
of the return to education, thereby accepting the distortion of education.
To derive clear-cut results, the analysis is conﬁned to an examination of
the stationary state. In the stationary state, the household’s decision varia-
bles remain constant. As usual, it is assumed that a unique stationary state
exists and that the economy converges to it. It would be straightforward to
introduce exogenous growth. To allow for a setting in which the economy
grows endogenously is however not possible. The reason for this limita-
tion is the speciﬁcation of the human capital production function. Lucas
(1988) and Caballe and Santos (1993) provide a discussion of the existence
and properties of a balancedgrowth path. They showthat the human capi-
tal production function must feature constant returns to scale with respect
to the stock of human capital.
4For further reference,see Lucas(1990),Bull(1993),Milesi-FerrettiandRoubini (1998),
Chari and Kehoe (1999), Barbie and Hermeling (2006), and Richter (2009).
62 The Model
2.1 Household’s Problem







u(ct,1− nt − et)
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ht+1 − (1− δh)ht − G(et)
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(2)
The household’s utility function u is strictly increasing and concave in
both arguments and continuously differentiable everywhere. The Inada
conditions apply to ensure interior solutions. In each period t the house-
hold faces a consumption-labor-leisure choice. It consumes ct, which is not
taxed,5 and devotes nt t i m eu n i t st ow o r ki nt h el a b o rm a r k e ta n det time
units to investment in human capital. The total time endowment is nor-
malized to one, i.e., nt + et +  t = 1, where  t is the amount of leisure. The
household combines its raw labor supply nt with the current stock of hu-
man capital ht.T h ep r o d u c tzt ≡ ntht is called the effective labor supply,6
it earns the after-tax wage rate (1 − τn
t )wt where wt is the real wage ra-
te. The household must spend resources (1 − τe
t )f per time unit invested
in human capital. One may think of f as tuition, books, and other related
5Taxing consumption only complicates the analysis without yielding further insights
in the present context.
6This speciﬁcation is a special case of Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997), who use the
more general function z = M(x,h,n) and assume that it exhibits constant returns to scale
with respect to h and market goods x. Judd (1999) works out that this speciﬁcation is not
innocuous, as any deviation gives rise to positive taxation of human capital. This point
Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997, p. 103) acknowledge.
7expenses. The government subsidizes this cost at rate τe
t . The household
lends capital kt+1 to the ﬁrm. The rate of return net of taxes and deprecia-
tion is Rk
t+1 ≡ (1 − τk
t )rt+1 + 1 − δk,w h e r ert is the real interest rate and
δk is the rate at which capital depreciates. The household may lend bt+1 to
the government which offers a rate of return of Rb
t+1 in the next period. In
period 0, the household earns income from capital Rk
0k0 and government
debt Rb
0b0. (1) is the household’s budget constraint in period t,w h i c hi s
associated with the Lagrange multipliers λt.
Associated with the Lagrange multiplier μt, the law of motion (2) des-
cribes the accumulation of human capital. Investments et enter the human
capital production function G, which is strictly increasing and concave,
i.e., G   < 0 < G . The crucial assumption is that the current stock of
human capital does not enter the production function; it does not increa-
se productivity. The output of G is added to the depreciated stock of hu-
man capital, the rate of depreciation being 0 < δh ≤ 1.7 Furthermore, the
human capital production function G is assumed to be isoelastic, that is,
γ ≡ G e/G < 1.8 Finally, β is the household’s discount factor, which, for
simplicity, stays constant over time.








≡ u t =( 1 − τn
t )wthtλt (4)
et : u t + λt(1 − τe
t )f = μtG (et) (5)
ht+1 : λt+1β(1 − τn
t+1)wt+1nt+1 + μt+1β(1 − δh)=μt (6)
7δh = 1 means the household cannot use the stock of human capital accumulated so
far in the next period.
8This is an assumption that features prominently in the literature. See Jacobs and Bo-
venberg (2008) for a discussion and their footnote 3 for more references.
8kt+1 : λt = βλt+1Rk
t+1 (7)
bt+1 : λt = βλt+1Rb
t+1 (8)




(9) is a familiar condition that states that there is arbitrage-freeness bet-
ween investments in physical capital and government bonds. Both invest-
ments promise the same rate of return in equilibrium.
Human capital can be regarded as an asset, similar to physical capital,
that yieldsa rate of return, which in equilibrium must be equal to the other

















t+1+i)wt+1+int+1+iG (et)(1 − δh)i
(1 − τe
t )f +( 1 − τn
t )wtht
(10)
The numerator in (10) summarizes the discounted sum of returns due
to a marginal investment et, henceforth referred to as the marginal (pri-
vate) return to education. The investment in period t not only increases




















also emerges, which holds as long as 0 < δh ≤ 1.
9tomorrow’s stock of human capital and thereby the wage earned, but also
the stock afterwards at the decreasing rate 1−δh.10 The denominator sum-
marizes the marginal (private) cost of education in period t, comprising
direct cost and foregone earnings. The optimality condition (10) reveals
arbitrage-freeness between investments in human and physical capital.
(10) also shows that the depreciation rate δh and the after-tax rate of re-
turn to physical capital investments Rk affect the discounted present value
of a time unit et invested in human capital similarly. An increasing capi-
tal tax rate, which reduces Rk, and an increasing rate of depreciation both
raise the marginal return to education (Davies and Whalley, 1991).
For further reference, the stationary state version of (10) is 11
β
1− β(1 − δh)
(1 − τn)wnG  =( 1 − τn)wh +( 1 − τe)f. (11)
(11) can be interpreted in the same way as (10). The household devo-
tes time to education up to the point where the marginal cost equals the
marginal return to education. One can also see that if the direct cost of
education were 100% tax-deductible, i.e., τn = τe, the choice of education
would be undistorted. Boskin (1975) was the ﬁrst to state this insight.
(11) also reveals that capital taxation does not affect the marginal re-
turn to education, because only the household’s discount factor β matters.
This means that only the labor tax rate τn and the rate of subsidization τe
affect the wedge between the marginal return to and the marginal cost of
education.
10To allow for δh = 1, 00 = 1m u s th o l d .
11Use 1 = βRk, which is the stationary state version of (7).
102.2 Firm’s problem
T h er e p r e s e n t a t i v eﬁ r mp r o d u c e st h es i n g l ec o n s u m p t i o ng o o du s i n ga
neoclassical constant-returns-to-scale production function. It maximizes
proﬁts
F(kt,ntht) − rtkt − wtntht
in capital kt and effective labor zt ≡ ntht, taking the capital rental rate









The constant-returns-to-scale production technology implies that the
ﬁrm makes zero proﬁt in equilibrium.
2.3 Government’s problem
The government ﬁnances an exogenously given stream of government ex-
penditures {gt}∞
t=0. Its per-period budget constraint is
gt + Rb
tbt = τk
t rtkt + τn
t wthtnt − τe
t fet + bt+1. (14)
2.4 Competitive Equilibrium













such that, given the price system and the government policy, the allo-
cation solves the household’s and ﬁrm’s problems, and the government
balances its budget. C is the set of the competitive equilibria that result












s.t. (3)− (8),(12)− (13),(1),(2) and (14) hold for all t = 0,1,...,
k0,b0 and h0 are given.

2.5 Social Planner’s Problem – First-Best Analysis
The social planner maximizes the household’s utility subject to the resour-








u(ct,1− nt − et)
+ θt
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ht+1 − (1 − δh)ht − G(et)

.
12The ﬁrst-order conditions for ct, et, nt, ht+1,a n dkt+1 are
ct : uct = θt (15)
et : μtG (et)=u t + θtf (16)
nt : θtFztht = u t (17)
ht+1 : θt+1βFzt+1nt+1 − μt + βμt+1(1 − δh)=0 (18)
kt+1 : θt = θt+1β(Fkt + 1− δk) (19)
Analogouslytothehousehold’sproblem, thefollowingcondition shows
how the social planner optimally chooses education12:









(Fkt+1+j + 1− δk)−1

Fzt+1+int+1+iG (et)(1 − δh)i
f + Fztht
(20)
The numerator in (20) is the discounted sum of marginal returns to in-
vestment et,h e n c e f o r t hc a l l e dm a r g i n a l( s o c i a l )r e t u r nt oe d u c a t i o n .T h e
investment in period t increases not only tomorrow’s stock of human ca-
pital and thereby the productivity but also the stock afterwards at the de-
creasing rate 1 − δh. The denominator captures the marginal (social) cost
in period t, comprising the direct cost of education and the loss of labor
income. The optimality condition (20) reveals that the rates of return to
physical and human capital accumulation are equal.
For further reference, the stationary-state version of (20) reads
β
1− β(1 − δh)
FznG  = Fzh + f. (21)
12Recursively eliminate μt+1 in (18), and use (16) and (19).
13Theefﬁciency condition (21)will serve asa benchmarkwhen analyzing
below how the education decision is affected by the use of distortionary
taxation. The preceding discussion therefore suggests the following
Deﬁnition 1. Education efﬁciency is achieved if the marginal social return to
education equals the marginal social cost of education. In the ﬁrst best, there is
no wedge between the marginal social return to and the marginal social cost of
education.
2.6 Ramsey Problem – Second-Best Analysis
Linear taxes are chosen to ﬁnance a given stream of government expendi-
tures. The choice of taxesshould maximizesocial welfare subject to resour-
ce and budget constraints and taking the household’s and ﬁrm’s competi-
tive equilibrium behavior into account. Each government policy gives rise
to a different competitive equilibrium. The Ramsey problem is to choose
the competitive equilibrium that yieldsthe highestutility. Tosolve the pro-
blem, the primal approach (Lucas and Stokey (1983), Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1980), Chari and Kehoe (1999)) is adopted.
Thisapproach isonewaytotake intoaccountthe competitive equilibri-
um behavior. Instead of choosing the optimal policy directly, which yields
the optimal allocation and prices, one chooses the optimal allocation that
is consistent with competitive equilibrium behavior and then solves for
the government policy and prices that support this outcome. The key to
solving this problem is to use the so-called implementability constraint
that summarizes the household’s competitive equilibrium behavior.
In the present model, three conditions on the Ramsey problem must
hold. The ﬁrst one, the implementability constraint, is the household’s
14budget constraint after having substituted for after-tax prices by means
of the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions.
Combining the per-period budget constraints (1) leads to the intertem-





























































bt+1 = 0 (24)
must hold. If (23) and (24) were positive, then the household could ﬁnd
an alternative allocation yielding a higher utility by simply consuming
more in ﬁnite time. The reverse cannot hold either, because some other
household has to be on the lending side and could increase utility for the
reason just explained.
Then, using the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions (3) and (4) and the-
reby substituting out (1 − τn
t )wtht, the intertemporal budget constraint





















, which is the value of the initial endow-
ment of physical capital and government bonds. (25) is the ﬁrst constraint
in the planner’s problem.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for et and ht+1, (5) and (6), which yield (10)
and determine the dynamic choice of ht+1, have not been used. Therefore,
they give rise to a second constraint, which Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi
(1997) and Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999) call an Euler equation for the
accumulation of human capital:
βnt+1u t+1h−1
t+1 + β(1 − δh)









t )f could also be eliminated in (25) using (26). But dealing with
the resulting double sum is cumbersome, which is why it is more conve-
nient to work with two implementability constraints. In any case, either
approach must yield the same solution. Pursuing the present way mixes
the primal and the dual approach, as the planner has to optimize over the
allocation and over the tax rate τe
t .
Third, the economy’s resource constraint is
F(kt,zt)+( 1 − δk)kt − ct − kt+1 − fet − gt = 0. (27)
The set R consists of all allocations that satisfy the three constraints





t=0 : (2),(25),(26) and (27) hold for all t = 0,1,...

16The Ramsey problem is to choose a member belonging to the set R that
yields the highest utility.
The key result to solving the Ramsey problem is the following
Proposition 1 (see Chari and Kehoe (1999), Proposition 1). The competitive
equilibrium allocations satisfy the resource constraints and the implementability
constraint. Furthermore, given allocations that satisfy these constraints, one can
construct policies and prices that, together with the given allocations, constitute
a competitive equilibrium. Put formally, C = R.
Proof. See appendix A.





















u t + uct(1 − τe
t )f
G (et)
+ β(1 − δh)
















deﬁning the so-called pseudo-welfare function, which includes the im-
plementability constraint and also depends on the endogenous Lagrange
multiplier φ. Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) follow the same approach.
17But their and the present setup differ substantially. First, due to the special
assumptions made regarding the human capital production function, they
show that human capital does not appear in the implementability cons-
traint. Second, when solving the Ramsey problem they neglect the Euler
equation for the accumulation of human capital (26). After having found
the solution to this relaxed problem, they show that this equation is sa-
tisﬁed anyway. Similarly, they derive a stationary-state arbitrage-freeness
condition for human capital and a corresponding Ramsey problem’s con-
dition. Because in their setup time devoted to education only gives rise to
some cost in the form of forgone earnings and because the labor income
tax is proportional, the tax cannot have an effect on education in a statio-
nary state. Both the return and the cost are taxed at the same rate, and both
are reduced in the same proportion.13 It is the implementability constraint
(26) that captures the transitional dynamics of the accumulation of human
capital. Setting up the problem in a way that allows one to put this cons-
traint aside and then to show that it is satisﬁed anyway does not, however,
help to explore the special nature of human capital.
As k0 is exogenous, τk
0 works like a lump-sum tax.14 To rule out this
trivial form of taxation, it is common to assume τk
0 = 0.
13Even more obviously, this is the case in Chari and Kehoe (1999), too.






φ measures the costs of using distortionary taxation. Optimally, τk
0 should be chosen
such that all government expenditures could be ﬁnanced by taxing away the return to
the initial stock of physical capital and thereby abstaining from levying distorting taxes
on capital and labor. The other three factors are positive. Therefore, φ > 0. It is then
possible to increase τk
0 until φ = 0 and the present problem coincides with the ﬁrst-best
problem. This renders the whole analysis uninteresting. See also Jones, Manuelli, and
Rossi (1997, p. 111).
18Under the assumption that a unique stationary state exists,15 the ﬁrst-
order conditions for ct, et, nt, ht+1, kt+1 and τe
t , evaluated at the stationary
state, are
c : Wc − θ − η

nuc h−1 − δh




















n : Wn + θFzh − η

h−1(−u  n + u ) − δh





h : μ = θ
β
1 − β(1 − δh)
Fzn + η
β
1− β(1 − δh)
nu h−2 (31)
k :1= β(Fk + 1− δk) (32)
τe : η
δh
G  = −φe (33)
The ﬁrst-order conditions (28)-(33), the resource constraint (27), the im-
plementability constraint (25), and the Euler equation (26) for the accumu-
lation of human capital determine the Ramsey allocation {c,e,n,h,k,τe}
along with the Lagrange multipliers θ, η,a n dφ.16
The following analysis is devoted to studying the tax rates τk, τn,a n d
15This is a common assumption frequently found in the literature. Judd (1999) uses a
compactness assumption on the marginal social value of government wealth instead of
the convergence assumption adopted here and shows that the average capital tax rate is
zero for any long interval.
16Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994) explain how to compute φ. First, ﬁx φ and solve
for the entire allocation, using all ﬁrst-order conditions and resource constraints. Then,
check whether this allocation satisﬁes the implementability constraint. If not, iterate on φ
until the constraint holds.
19τe that implement the Ramsey allocation as a competitive equilibrium,
R⊆C .17
Proposition 2. Capital income is not taxed in the stationary state, i.e., τk = 0.
Proof. Combine (32) with (7) evaluated at the stationary state.
This is the seminal result by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985). Evident-
ly, the private and social rates of return to capital investments are equal.
The zero-capital-tax result is independent of whether the model features
human capital or not. From this follows that there is no trade-off between
efﬁciency in physical and human capital formation.
Proposition 3. 1. Labor income is taxed in the stationary state if the human
capital production function’s elasticity is sufﬁciently small.









(1 − γ)n + e

< 1+ 1/φ (34)


















































17See Proposition 1 for the central argument.
202. τn < 1 amounts to requiring the condition (34) to hold.
Restrictions are imposed on the household’s preferences and the pro-
perties of the human capital production function. Suppose the utility func-
tion reads u(c, )=lnc+κ ln . In thisspecial case, conditions 1 and2 then
reduce to γ < 1/(1 + n/ ) and 1 < 1+1/φ. Condition 1 says that the ela-
sticity parameter has to be below unity, as has been assumed above on
page 8. Condition 2 is always satisﬁed as long as distortionary taxes are
used.
Proposition 4. Even if the human capital production function is isoelastic, the
education decision is distorted. In the second best, there is underinvestment in
human capital relative to the ﬁrst best.
Proof. Combine (26), (29), (30), (31), and (33) to obtain18
β




γu  + Fzh + f. (35)
Equation (35) states that the discounted ﬂow of marginal returns to




The distortion term is positive, as each Lagrange multiplier is positi-
ve. Therefore, the marginal social return, which is decreasing in e,i sl a r g e r
than the marginal social cost, which is constant in e. The household is re-
quired to underinvest in human capital relative to the ﬁrst best.
18See appendix B for the details.
21Giventhatthe education decision isdistorted, the nextquestion iswhat
this means for the tax rates.
Corollary 1. In the stationary state, the direct cost of education is not fully tax-
deductible, that is, τe < τn.




γu  +( 1 − τn)(Fzh + f)=( 1 − τn)Fzh +( 1 − τe)f
⇔ (1 − τn)
φ
θ
γu  =( τn − τe)f
All the Lagrange multipliers are positive. Given that τn < 1, the desired
result follows.
The preceding results allow one to study how the social and the private
return to education are related to each other.
Corollary 2. 1. The private rate of return to capital investments is equal to
t h es o c i a lr a t eo fr e t u r n .
2. The private rate of return to capital investments is equal to the private rate
of return to education.
3. The private rate of return to education is smaller than the social rate of
return. Education is effectively taxed.
Proof. One has to show that
(1−τk)r+1−δk = Fk +1−δk =
Fz(1−τn)nG 
1−β(1−δh)






The ﬁrst and second equalities follow from Proposition 2 and (11). (32)
and Proposition 4 imply the inequality.
22The marginal social return is taxed at a higher rate than the marginal
social cost. The result is that this tax scheme negatively distorts education
incentives, as Proposition 4 clariﬁes.
To shed more light on the above results, consider the government’s
stationary-state budget constraint (14), which can be written as follows:
g +(RB − 1)b = τn(whn − fe)+( τn − τe)fe
The direct cost of education is taxed at the rate (τn − τe) as long as
τn > τe. Suppose that the converse were true, and consider a marginal
decrease of τe.T h e nτn has to decline as well if the government’s budget
constraint is to continue to hold. τn ≤ τe implies the privater a t eo fr e t u r n
to education to be larger than the social rate of return. The considered
tax reform has the effect that the marginal cost of education, consisting
of the direct cost and forgone earnings, increases less than the marginal
return. As a result, the private rate of return to education increases. Ce-
teris paribus, the household earns more income and hence consumption
rises which increases utility. An efﬁciency gain would result, which is not
possible, given that the planner maximizes efﬁciency.
3 Conclusion and Disussion
This paper explores the special nature of human capital compared to phy-
sical capital inan optimal taxation model.Capitalincome remainsuntaxed
in the stationary state. The presence of human capital does not interfere
with this result. This means taxing capital and human capital are two dis-
tinct issues and capital taxation is not a means to guide efﬁcient education
policy. This leaves labor taxation and the subsidization of the direct cost of
23education as the only instruments to set efﬁcient education incentives.
As the human capital production function includes time as the only
production factor and not the current stock of human capital, the analy-
sis calls for effective taxation of education, thereby partly extracting the
ability rent. To achieve this end, the cost of education is not fully tax-
deductible. As a consequence, the subsidy is insufﬁcient in encouraging
education and to offset the distortions caused by the tax on labor.
Critical is the assumption that the cost of education is fully observable.
This allows the government to use this piece of information to set an ef-
fective tax on education. Otherwise it has to resort to the labor tax alone
to achieve this end, which would imply higher welfare costs. In reality it
i sn o tt h a te a s yt og e te x a c td a t ao nt h et i m es p e n to ne d u c a t i o n .L i k e w i s e
it is not possible to precisely estimate the stock of human capital.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
1. C⊆R :
The statement is true because the implementability constraint is the
intertemporal budget constraint after having substituted out prices
using the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions. Derive (26) by combi-
ning (5) and (6) and substituting out prices again. Because the hou-
sehold’s and government’s budget constraints are satisﬁed, the re-
source constraint is satisﬁed by Walras’s law. This proves the ﬁrst
inclusion.
2. R⊆C :
Theconverse, thatanyallocation satisfying theimplementabilityand
resource constraints satisﬁes competitive equilibrium behavior, is al-
so true. This amounts to ﬁnding prices and a government policy, na-
mely tax rates, such that the allocation that is in R is also in C.T o
derive Rb
t+1 use (3) and (8). Obtain rt and wt from (12) and (13). (3)
and (4) yield τn
t . (3) and (7) determine τk
t . τe
t is deﬁned recursively by
(5) and (6).
26Byconstruction, the Ramseyallocation satisﬁes the household’s bud-
get constraint and the economy’s resource constraint. ByWalras’ law,
the government’s budget constraint is satisﬁed as well.
B Derivation of (35)





Equalize (29) and (30), and plug in (37):
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G  + φu  n − φu  (38)
(2) yields h = G +( 1 − δh)h, which is equivalent to 1/G = 1/(δhh).
Using the constant elasticity γ of G and substituting for μ by means of
(31), one can manipulate (38) as follows:
θ
β
1 − β(1 − δh)
FznG  − φγ

β
1 − β(1 − δh)
G nu h−1 − uc(1 − τe)f

= θ(Fzh + f) (39)
The stationary-state version of (26) reads
β
1− β(1 − δh)
G nu h−1 = u  + uc(1 − τe)f. (40)
27Plug (40) into (39) to ﬁnally derive (35):
β




γu  + Fzh + f (35)
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